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RECENT CASES
secution exhibited overreaching and reprosecution was barred under the
Double Jeopardy Clause.
The majority of decisions which had previously considered the prob-
lem of prosecutorial overreaching and mistrial on motion of the defendant
seemed to require intentional misconduct that was intended to precipitate
the mistrial request of the defendant. Kessler, on the other hand, suggests
that the commission of intentional error by the prosecution which seriously
prejudices the defendant may be sufficient to constitute prosecutorial
overreaching, notwithstanding that the misconduct was not calculated by
the prosecution to induce a mistrial motion by the defendant.
The standard for overreaching employed in Kessler retains a balance
between society's interest in conviction of the guilty and the defendant's
right to a fair trial before a particular tribunal. While not requiring evi-
dence of misconduct for an improper purpose, a high standard for over-
reaching is obtained by the requirement of intentional misconduct by the
prosecution. Intentional misconduct by the prosecution, regardless of its
motivating purpose, can result in extreme prejudice to the defendant and
necessitate a request for a mistrial by the defendant. In these instances, it
would appear that the standard for overreaching in Kessler is consistent
with the Double Jeopardy Clause, its purpose being to avoid the subjection
of the defendant to unwarranted expense, ordeal and embarassment.
MICHAEL G. HEITZ
PER QUOD SERVITIUM AMISIT-AN ANOMALY?
Frank Horton & Co. v. DiggsI
Estel Gideon, vice-president of the plaintiff corporation, was injured
when the company truck he was driving collided with a vehicle negligently
operated by the defendant, George Diggs. Gideon was in charge of the
company's work crew operations, and as a result of his injuries, could not
recruit and field an additional crew necessary to complete installation of
underground communication cables the company had contracted to lay. It
was alleged that Gideon was the only man capable of performing the
services causing a loss by the company of $150,000 profits. The plaintiff
brought an action against Diggs to recover for the loss of Gideon's services.
The trial court dismissed this claim on the ground of failure to state a claim
for relief, and the Kansas City District of the Missouri Court of Appeals
affirmed.2
1. 544 S.W.2d 313 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976).
2. Id. at 317.
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The court of appeals stated that prior cases had not given effect to the
common law action per quod servitium amisit,a which allows a master to
recover for the loss of services of a negligently injured servant. The court
held that recognition of such an action would "contradict enlighted public
policy."4 They reasoned that the common law remedy originated when
service was a status and the servant was treated as little more than a chattel
of the master. The court stated that in contemporary society the servant
has become an independent person whose relationship with the master
rests on contract. Contractual interests have not been protected from mere
negligent interference because to do so would impose an undue burden on
freedom of action and a severe penalty for inadvertence. The court con-
cluded that the shift from status to contract rendered the cause of action an
anomaly.
The court relied heavily on an English case, Inland Revenue Commis-
sioners v. Hambrook,5 which recognized per quod but limited it to recovery
for loss of services of menial and domestic servants. The Missouri court
cited other cases recognizing this limited form of the action, and in a
footnote stated that it was not called upon to decide the validity of those
decisions since Gideon was not a menial or domestic servant.
6
Horton is in keeping with a general trend in the United States to reject
the action, at least where menial servants are not involved.7 The master's
interest is deemed an economic one and application of per quod is equated
3. The court treats this case as one of first impression, rejecting the plaintiff's
contention that Missouri recognized the cause of action in Dunn v. Cass Avenue &
Fairgrounds Ry. Co., 21 Mo. App. 188 (1886). The court reasoned that Dunn spoke
of per quod servitium amisit not in recognition of the action, but only because the writ
in the action for the father's loss of services of his child had to comply with the
"fictive formalities" of the period. Arguably, however, the Dunn court was recogniz-
ing per quod, and when they said the "[rlight to recover is predicated on the relation
of master and servant, and not on the relation of parent and child," 21 Mo. App. at
204, they were speaking not in terms of what the formal writ required, but rather
were saying that the fact of a loss would not be gathered from the mere existence of
a parent-child relationship. The parent must in addition plead and prove that the
child did in fact serve him and that the child's services were in fact lost. While the
court does not devote much of the opinion to expressing its acceptance of per quod,
the manner in which the court refers to it appears to point to its acceptance being
taken for granted.
4. 544 S.W.2d at 316.
5. [1956] 2 Q.B. 641; Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 790 (1958).
6. 544 S.W.2d at 316 n.2.
7. Phoenix Prof. Hockey Club v. Hirmer, 108 Ariz. 482, 502 P.2d 164
(1972); Bonfanti Indus., Inc. v. Teke, Inc., 224 So.2d 15 (La. App.), aff'd, 226 So.2d
770 (La. 1969); Ferguson v. Green Island Contracting Corp., 44 App. Div. 2d 358,
355 N.Y.S.2d 196 (1974); Ferguson v. Rensselaer County Air Park, Inc., 75 Misc.2d
818, 348 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Myrurgia Perfumes, Inc. v. American
Airlines, Inc., 68 Misc.2d 712, 327 N.Y.S.2d 861 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1971); Snow v.
West, 250 Ore. 114, 440 P.2d 864 (1968); Nemo Foundations, Inc. v. New River
Co., 181 S.E.2d 687 (W.Va. 1971); Seavey, Liability to Master for Negligent Harm to
Servant, WASH. U.L.Q. 309 (1956).
[Vol. 42
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with allowing recovery for negligently-caused economic loss.8 Non-
recovery for economic loss has been explained as a refusal to penalize a
defendant for losses not reasonably foreseeable, a means of containing the
amount of litigation arising out of a negligent act, and as a form of loss
distribution.9 Rejecting per quod would appear to serve these ends. Al-
though liability insurance, if available, might serve to distribute loss and
lessen the burden on an inadvertent defendant, it is arguably more effi-
cient for potential plaintiffs to obtain insurance on their own limited
interests than for potential defendants to obtain vast amounts of insurance
for all types of economic loss.
10
While the above reasoning for rejection of the action is attractive, the
Missouri court may have acted too hastily in casting off a cause of action
with a long history of recognition. The court relied a great extent on
Hambrook and American cases that cite it." A survey of commentaries
analyzing that opinion, however, reveals a consensus that the opinion
included clearly erroneous statements about the historical development of
per quod.
The Hambrook case held that the action per quod was limited to the loss
of services of menials or domestics only. The opinion set forth an elaborate
historical treatment of the action's development and concluded that per
quod became limited to menials in the 18th century. An examination of
opinions from that period shows that this was not the case.' 2 Thus, the
Hambrook case with its historically ill-founded limitation is questionable
authority upon which to rely.
While the Missouri court in Horton gave much consideration to this
English decision, the opinion failed to consider cases from Canada and
Australia rejecting Hambrook and recognizing per quod servitium amisit
without the English-imposed limitation."i The leading Australian case re-
8. Seavey, Liability to Master for Negligent Harm to Servant, WASH U.L.Q. 309
(1956).
9. Note, Torts, Interference with Business or Occupation-Commercial Fisherman
Can Recover Profits Lost as a Result of Negligently Caused Oil Spill-Union Oil Co. v.
Oppen, 502 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974), 88 HARV. L. REV. 444 (1974).
10. Id. at 449.
11. Steele v. J. & S. Metals, Inc., 335 A.2d (Conn. 1974); Nemo Foundations,
Inc., v. New River Co., 181 S.E.2d 687 (W.Va. 1971).
12. In Commissioner for Railways (N.S.W.) v. Scott, [1959] Argus L.R. 896,
the Australian High Court rejected the limitation placed on the action by the
Hambrook decision. A detailed historical examination by the court revealed the
error made in Hambrook. The Scott court in its analysis referred to research done by
Gareth Jones. Mr. Jones surveyed cases dealing with per quod and stated that there
was no evidence that the action was limited in the 18th century. He based part of
this conclusion on the fact that pleading manuals of the era showed no hint of such
limitation. Jones, Per Quod Servitium Amisit, 74 L.Q. REv. 39 (1958). Other com-
mentators have affirmed the conclusion that the Hambrook limitation on the action
was not historically required. 34 CAN. B. REV. 1078 (1956); 75 L.Q. REv. 460 (1959).
13. Commissioner for Railways (N.S.W.) v. Scott, [1959] Argus L.R. 896, the
High Court of Australia expressly rejected the Hambrook decision and stated that
1977]
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cognizing per quod was quick to point out that the action in the middle ages
had its rationale in the master's property interest in the loss of services rather
than a property interest in the servant's person. 14 The fact that a master
had no right of action for injury of his servant unless he thereby lost his
services was made clear in Robert Mary's Case where the court concluded,
"[b]e the battery greater or less, if the master does not lose the services of
his servant, he shall not have an action."' 5 The emphasis is not on the
master's proprietary interest in the servant, but rather the economic dam-
age sustained by the loss of his services. 16 Thus, the Missouri court's
rejection of the action on the grounds that it originated at a time when a
master had a property interest in a servant is without cause.
Even if the court had grounds for saying the action was based on a
master's possessory rights in his servant, the assumption would hardly
present grounds for its rejection. Other rules of law, such as respondeat
superior, relating to the master-servant relationship and to the effect of that
relationship on third parties arose out of the master's proprietary rights. '
7
These actions have not been rejected even though the background from
which they arose no longer exists. A look at per quod's history reveals that it
survived the transition from status to contract and has been recognized by
courts long after this gradual transition.'8 Courts apparently felt no com-
pulsion to reject the action after the change took place, and continued to
recognize it.
The court in Horton chose to call the action an "anomaly"; however,
the action's historical development does not appear to cry out for its
rejection, and there are additional reasons for arguing that the court's
conclusion is not justified. The Horton court, and others rejecting per quod,
cite the undue burden the action places upon the inadvertent defendant.
The courts refer to the lack of foreseeability that the injury will also impair
the services owed to the master, who is characterized as an unforeseeable
plaintiff. However, in the products liability area, courts have held manufac-
turers of defective products strictly liable to non-using, non-contracting
bystanders. 9 While many courts limit recovery to foreseeable plaintiffs, 20
per quod was not limited to recovery for the loss of services of menials and domestics.
In The King v. Richardson and Adams, [1948] 2 D.L.R. 305, Canada recognized the
cause of action. While some Canadian cases decided after Hambrook reach opposite
results, the latest Canadian opinions have reinstated per quod without the menial
servant limitation. Genereux v. Peterson, Howell & Heather (Canada) Ltd. [1973]
34 D.L.R.3d 614; Gibson v. Dool, [1970] 12 D.L.R.3d 325; Kneeshaw & Spawton's
Crumpet Co. Ltd. v. Latendorff [1966] 54 D.L.R.2d 84.
14. Commissioner for Railways (N.S.W.) v. Scott, [1959] Argus L.R. 896.
15. 77 Eng. Rep. 895, 898, [1612] 9 Co. Rep. 111, 113a.
16. 34 CAN. B. REV. 1078, 1080 (1956).
17. Commissioner for Railways (N.S.W.) v. Scott, [1969] Argus L.R. 896,918,
935.
18. Id. at 914.
19. Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 776, 781 (N.D. Ind. 1971);
Giberson v. Ford Motor Co., 504 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. 1974); Codling v. Paglia, 32
494 [Vol. 42
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some recent decisions have not required foreseeability and have made
causation by a defective product the only prerequisite to recovery.21 While
the analogy is not perfect, 22 the fact that courts have reduced the prere-
quisites to recovery in the field of products liability weakens the basis for
the Horton court's insistence on a strict application of proximate cause.
The court in Horton relied heavily on the notion that the master-ser-
vant relationship had changed from status to contract in characterizing the
action as anomalous. However, some authorities say that the trend of
modern social policy and labor law is away from the classic economic view
of labor as an ordinary commodity, and toward regarding the employer-
employee relationship as involving a complex status with rights and duties
comprehending more than performance of agreed services for a con-
tracted wage.2" To the extent that this contention is accepted, the consider-
ations which originally gave rise to per quod would lead to its continued
recognition.
Another basis for arguing that the action is not an anachronism is the
real anomaly that is created by the recognition of the limited action per quod
set out in Hambrook. In that opinion recovery was limited to the loss of
services of menial or domestic servants. However, in an age when highly
specialized and qualified key employees are hired, restricting the action
creates the paradoxical result of having the protection of the employer
stand in inverse ratio to his loss. Under the Hambrook rule, the more
responsible the employee's position and the greater the difficulty of replac-
ing him, the less chance his employer would have to recover damages for
the loss of his services. 24
There is another basis for argument that limitation of the action to the
loss of services of menials is unjustified. Even if the action was originally
available in the case of injury to a servant by status, it is impossible to say
that "menial" or "domestic" properly describe a modern equivalent for
which the master can receive compensation. 25
N.Y.2d 330, 341, 298 N.E.2d 622, 627 (1973); Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis.2d 247,
255, 201 N.W.2d 825, 829 (1972).
20. See, e.g., Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir.
1971); Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578,451 P.2d 84,75 Cal. Rptr.
625 (1969); Lamendola v. Mizell, 115 N.J. Super. 514, 280 A.2d 241 (1971).
21. Lamendola v. Mizell, 115 N.J. Super. 514, 280 A.2d 241 (1971); Howes v.
Hansen, 56 Wis.2d 247, 259, 201 N.W.2d 825, 831 (1972). See Jentz & Collins,
Extension of Strict Liability to All Third Persons, 12 AM. Bus.L.J. 231, 244 (1975).
22. The analogy is not perfect because liability without fault cannot be
equated with unlimited liability.
23. Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 802, 804 n. 12 (1958). See also, Smith, Is Employment
Properly Analyzed in Terms of a Contract?, 2 NEw ZEALAND U.L. REV. 413 (1960);
Kahn-Freund, A Note on Status and Contract in British Labor Law, 30 M.L.R. 635
(1967).
24. Gibson v. Dool, [1970] 12 D.L.R.3d 325; J. FLEMING, THE LAW OFTORTS,
349 (3d ed. 1965).
25. Commissioner for Railways (N.S.W.) v. Scott [1959] Argus L.R. 896, 918,
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